The popular press and scholarly studies have noted a number of trends in corporate governance. This paper addresses the broad question of whether these trends are linked. And, if so, how? The paper finds that a trend toward greater board diligence will lead to trends toward more external candidates becoming ceo, shorter tenures for ceos, more effort being expended by ceos (equivalently less perquisite consumption), and greater ceo compensation. A trend toward greater board diligence need not be exogenous. The paper shows how changes in firm hierarchies could result in a trend toward more independent boards.
Introduction
The corporate form has existed for centuries. The East India Company, for example, was chartered by Elizabeth i in 1600 (Baskin and Miranti, 1997) . One might imagine given this long history, that the issue of how corporations should be governed would have been settled some time ago. Yet, for nearly as long as corporations have existed, there have been complaints about corporate governance and agitation to improve it.
1 Moreover, these complaints and agitation do not seem to be purely hot air. Over the centuries, they have led to various changes in corporate law and regulation, including up to the present, with laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Even ignoring legally imposed changes, there appear to be ongoing trends in corporate governance.
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But what do we make of such trends? If regulatory and other pressures are leading to, say, more diligent boards of directors, what else should we expect to see as consequences? Alternatively, could there be organic changes in corporations that lead to increased diligence and, if so, what are they and how do they affect the board? Furthermore, how do the various trends in governance relate to each other? What trends may plausibly be causing other trends? What covariance in trends may simply be spurious? The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework from in which to answer such questions. This framework allows one, for instance, to trace through the consequences of pressure for greater representation of outsiders on boards for issues such as who gets hired as Chief Executive Officer (ceo), how long he might be expected to serve, and how much he might expect to be paid.
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Reflecting the concern of many reform efforts, this paper focuses on the board of directors. While the statutory authority of the board is relative broad, the best empirical evidence indicates that boards play a significant role in only a few corporate decisions (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 , for a survey of this evidence). Among those in which the board does play a significant role, the most common -and arguably among the most important -are those decisions pertaining to the selection, monitoring, and retention (or dismissal) of the ceo (see, e.g., Mace, 1971, and Vancil, 1987 , for discussion; see also Weisbach, 1988 , for statistical evidence). Consequently, the basic model developed here is one in which the board makes a decision about whom to hire; a subsequent decision about how intensely to monitor him; and, depending on what it learns from its monitoring, a final decision about retaining him or firing him. Section 2 sets out this basic model, while Section 3 analyzes it.
Initially, the choice of whom to hire is between an internal candidate and an external candidate. The primary difference between these candidates is that less is known about the external candidate, which translates into his ability being estimated with less precision than the internal candidate's. Because the board has the option to dismiss the ceo, it values uncertainty about the ceo's ability (it enjoys the upside potential, but can escape the downside risk). This makes external candidates more desirable ceteris paribus. This desirability increases, the more likely it is that the board will be in a position to exercise its option, which, in turn, is more likely the more diligently it monitors the ceo. Hence, if there is a trend toward greater board diligence, then there should be a corresponding trend toward greater external hiring of ceos.
Because the probability of dismissal increases with the intensity of board monitoring, a straightforward prediction of the model is that greater board diligence should lead to shorter ceo tenures on average. This effect is strengthened in an indirect way: Because greater diligence increases the option value of a new ceo, increased diligence makes boards more willing to tradeoff a higher estimated ability for greater uncertainty about ability. Hence, the average estimated ability of ceos hired should decrease as board diligence increases. Given that the sample of hired ceos is of lower average quality, their tenure should be correspondingly lower on average as well. Depending on the underlying distribution of estimated abilities in the populations of internal and external candidates, this last insight plausibly suggests that external candidates' expected tenure as ceo will be less than internal candidates'.
In the initial model and analysis (Sections 2-4), the question of whether the ceo expends effort is ignored. In Section 5, the issue of ceo effort is considered (alternatively and equivalently, the ceo's decision to forgo consumption of perquisites).
4 A consequence of greater board diligence with respect to monitoring is an increase in ceo effort. At first, this might seem like a "no-brainer" conclusion, but it does, in fact, involve some subtlety. In this model, monitoring reveals nothing about ceo effort in equilibrium. The board monitors because it wants to improve its estimate of the ceo's inherent ability, not learn how much effort he has or hasn't expended. Yet, because the ceo's effort can affect the inferences the board draws, the ceo has an incentive to increase his effort in hopes of raising the board's estimate of his ability (in equilibrium, his hopes go unrealized because the board can subtract out the equilibrium level of effort from the signal it observes). The ceo's incentives to increase effort are greater the more likely it is that the board will make a decision about retaining him based on its inference of his ability; and this likelihood is, in turn, an increasing function of the board's diligence.
If the consequence of a more diligent board is to make the ceo work harder in equilibrium, then the ceo's equilibrium utility will have fallen and he will presumably demand compensation for this. Indeed, even without the issue of ceo effort, greater board diligence translates into lower expected utility for the ceo ceteris paribus. Hence, as spelled out in Section 6, a prediction of the model is that a trend towards greater board diligence should lead to a trend toward greater ceo compensation.
This prediction about the time-series correlation between board diligence and executive compensation would seem at odds with the view, expressed for example by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , that it is weak boards that tend to "overpay" their ceos. As I show in Section 6, an inverse relation between board diligence and ceo compensation can exist in cross-sectional data even though the two variables positively covary in time-series data: Board diligence and ceo ability are, in a sense, substitutes. Hence, it could be the less diligent boards that have the stronger demand for the ceos with the higher estimated ability. Because such "star" ceos command, not surprisingly, a wage premium, it could well be the less diligent boards that are the ones which hire the more expensive ceos.
5 But as all boards become more diligent, the compensation-for-increaseddisutility effect leads to an overall trend toward higher ceo compensation.
While, as discussed in Section 4.1, there is evidence of a possibly exogenous trend toward greater board diligence, it is interesting to ask whether that trend could emerge organically from other changes in firms. One trend that has received much attention is the trend toward flatter corporate hierarchies (see, e.g., Rajan and Wulf, 2003) . In Section 4.2, I show how a flatter hierarchy could lead to a reduction, in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance, in the quality of internal ceo candidates. Next, I show that there are circumstances in which a reduction in the quality of the candidate pool increases the marginal benefit to increased board diligence; which, in turn, leads to more diligent boards. That is, it is possible that a trend toward flatter hierarchies is helping to generate a trend toward more diligent boards.
The framework presented here offers a means of tying together a number of trends in corporate governance. By and large its predictions coincide with the existing empirical evidence and the model makes some predictions that have not yet been tested (e.g., the possibility that ceos hired from the outside have, on average, shorter tenures than those hired from the inside). Yet, like any economic model, it has its limits. Many of these limitations are discussed in the course of the paper, but a few are best left for discussion at the end (Section 7).
5 The bargaining model of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) offers an alternative explanation for a negative covariance between board diligence and ceo compensation in cross-sectional data: Better ceos have more bargaining power vis-à-vis the board and are, thus, able to get more of what they want: less scrutiny from the board and higher pay. That is, in the Hermalin and Weisbach model, the negative correlation between board diligence and ceo compensation is spurious -both variables are driven by ceo ability.
Model

Timing
The model has the following timing.
Stage . At the start, a board of directors needs to hire a new ceo for the firm. It has a choice of an internal candidate (subscript I) or an external candidate (subscript E). There are commonly held prior distributions about the ability, α, of each candidate. Specifically, α is distributed normally with mean µ (µ E for the external candidate and µ I for the internal candidate) and variance 1/τ (τ is the precision of the distribution; τ E for the external candidate and τ I for the internal candidate). Reflecting that more is generally known about how an internal candidate will do as ceo than about how an external candidate will do, assume
Stage . The board may acquire a private signal, y, about the ceo it has hired. The probability that the board acquires this signal depends on the intensity with which it monitors the ceo. The signal is distributed normally with a mean equal to the ceo's ability, α, and a variance equal to 1/s. The precision s is the same regardless of which candidate became ceo.
Stage . If the board obtains the signal, it updates its estimate of the ceo's ability. Based on this posterior estimate, the board may decide to fire the ceo and hire a replacement. A replacement ceo's ability, α R , represents a random draw from a normal distribution with mean µ R = 0 and variance 1/τ R . Setting µ R to zero is a convenient normalization without loss of generality. Because what is of the interest is the board's replacing the incumbent ceo in response to a bad signal, assume neither µ E nor µ I is less than zero (were µ E or µ I < 0, then the incumbent ceo would lose his job both when a bad signal is obtained and when no signal is obtained). The assumption that the mean ability of a replacement ceo is lower than the (unconditional) mean ability of an incumbent can be justified as follows: Firing the ceo "early" triggers a succession before the normal transition process will have run; hence, the pool of candidate successors is likely weaker than it would be in a normal succession process. A complementary justification is that µ R is the expected value of the firm under a caretaker administration that is not (fully) able to pursue new initiatives or respond aggressively to changes in the strategic environment. 6 Along these same lines, a further justification is that µ R represents the expected ability of a new ceo minus such disruption costs.
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Stage . Earnings, x, are realized. Earnings are distributed normally with a mean equal to the ability of the ceo in place (the one hired in stage 1 or his replacement if he's replaced in stage 3). The random variables y − α and x − α are independently distributed.
Preferences and Ability
A ceo's ability is fixed throughout his career. I follow Holmstrom (1999) by assuming that ceos and boards are symmetrically informed; in particular, both parties know only that the ceo's ability is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and precision τ . This assumption can by justified by noting that a critical component about a ceo's ability is the match between him and the job of being ceo, about which both parties are likely to be equally uncertain. Moreover, both parties are likely to have similar knowledge of those aspects of ability revealed by prior work experience. I assume that individual directors like higher earnings, but find monitoring to be costly; where monitoring is defined as the efforts made to acquire the signal y.
8 Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , I assume the preferences of the individual directors can be aggregated in such a way that the board acts as if it has a single utility function that positively weights earnings, but negatively weights efforts to monitor. Such efforts can be translated, without loss of generality, into the probability -denoted by p -that the board acquires the signal y. Assume further, as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , that the board's utility function is additively separable:
where c(p) denotes the cost or disutility incurred by the board and θ and 1 − θ are the weights on the two components. Because utilities are defined up to an affine transformation only, there is no further loss of generality in re-expressing (1) as
where δ > 0 is a measure of the board's diligence or independence. 9 Assume that c(·) is strictly increasing for p > 0, strictly convex, and twice-differentiable. The factor δ is meant to capture those aspects of the board that affect how it weighs the cost of monitoring versus the higher profits that such monitoring can provide. This factor would, for instance, be expected to vary inversely with (i) the proportion of inside directors on the board -insiders presumably have reasons to dislike monitoring themselves or their boss, the ceo; (ii) the opportunity cost of the directors' time; (iii) directors' incentives not to "rock the boat" (e.g., to increase their chances for additional directorships with other firms); and (iv) the strengths of the personal ties between directors and the ceo.
Updating Beliefs and Optimal Monitoring
If the board obtains the signal, y, the posterior distribution of the ceo's ability is normal with meanμ and precisionτ , wherê e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167) .
Observe that the expected value of earnings, x, is the expected value of the ceo's ability. Therefore, it isμ if a signal is obtained and the incumbent ceo is retained; µ if no signal is obtained and the incumbent ceo is retained; and µ R = 0 if a replacement ceo is hired. By assumption µ I ≥ 0 and µ E ≥ 0, so, conditional on no signal being obtained, the board maximizes firm expected earnings by retaining the incumbent ceo. If a signal is obtained, then expected earnings are maximized by firing the incumbent ceo and hiring a replacement if and only ifμ < 0 = µ R . Hence, the rule for replacing the incumbent ceo is to replace him if and only if the signal y satisfies
Note Y is the cutoff value for the signal, below which the incumbent loses his job.
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The distribution of the signal y given the ceo's true ability, α, is normal with mean α and variance 1/s; hence, the distribution of y given the prior estimate of the ceo's ability, µ, is normal with mean µ and variance 1/s + 1/τ .
11 Define H = sτ s + τ to be the precision of y given µ.
The firm's expected earnings if it will learn y are
The option to fire the incumbent ceo is a valuable one, hence V > µ for all τ .
10 As a convention, functions of many variables, such as Y , will be denoted by capital letters.
11 The random variable y − µ is the sum of two independently distributed normal variables y − α and α − µ; hence, y − µ is also normally distributed. The means of these two random variables are both zero, so the mean of y given µ is, thus, µ. The variance of the two variables are 1/s and 1/τ respectively, so the variance of y − µ and, therefore, y given µ is 1/s + 1/τ .
A change of variables from y to z ≡ √ H(y −µ) reveals that V can be written as
where Φ(·) is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable (i.e., with mean zero and variance one), φ(·) is its corresponding density function, and the second line follows from the first because the standard normal is symmetric about zero. Note that
is the probability that the ceo will be retained if a signal is obtained.
Analysis
In deciding how intensely to monitor the ceo (i.e., what p to choose), the board solves max
This expression is global concave in p. For convenience, attention will be limited to cases in which (5) has an interior solution.
12 The first-order condition for (5),
is sufficient, as well as necessary, and admits a unique solution. Let P * be the solution to (6). Properties of P * are: 13 All proofs may be found in the appendix.
One way to interpret Proposition 1 is in terms of the gain from obtaining a signal about the ceo, which is V − µ (this is, essentially, the marginal return to monitoring, p, see (6)). The marginal value of the signal increases the greater is the likelihood it will be decisive with regard to whether the ceo is retained or fired. If the prior about the ceo's ability is high, then the signal is less likely to be decisive. Similarly, if the precision of that prior estimate is high, then the signal is less likely to be decisive. Because the board will rationally monitor less the lower is the value of the signal, these insights explain results (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.
The next set of questions has to do with whether the board hires the internal or external candidate in stage 1: 
Corollary 1 A necessary condition for the internal candidate to be hired is that his estimated ability be strictly greater than that of the external candidate (i.e., that µ I > µ E ).
Corollary 1 may, at first, seem surprising. After all, we often think of internal candidates having the inside track rather than facing a higher hurdle than external candidates. To understand why internal candidates are not advantaged -indeed, are disadvantaged -recall that an external candidate's ability is less well estimated than an internal candidate's. This greater uncertainty about the external candidate means that he has the greater option value ceteris paribus; which in turn makes him the more desirable candidate ceteris paribus. For the internal candidate to be competitive, he must, therefore, have a higher estimated ability than the external candidate.
The second half of Proposition 2 follows because the the more independent the board is (i.e., the greater is δ), the more intensely it monitors (i.e., the greater is p, see Proposition 1). In turn, this means that a more independent board is more likely to be in a situation to exercise the option of dismissing the ceo; which in turn raises the importance it places on having that option. Consequently, the value of the external candidate is greater vis-à-vis the internal candidate ceteris paribus; hence, the higher-ability hurdle for the internal candidate goes up.
The second half of Proposition 2 implies that more independent boards -or boards otherwise more disposed toward monitoring -will be more likely to hire external candidates than less independent boards -or boards otherwise less disposed toward monitoring. Given the perceived wisdom that outside directors are more independent or otherwise more inclined to monitor, 14 this suggests that the tendency to hire external candidates increases with the proportion of outside directors on the board. This prediction is consistent with the empirical findings of Borokhovich et al. (1996) and Dahya and McConnell (2001) , who find evidence in support of this hypothesis using us and uk data, respectively. Furthermore, controlling for the level of board independence, δ, internal candidates and external candidates will be treated differently if hired as ceos. From Corollary 1, an internal candidate who gets the job must have a higher estimated ability, µ I , than an external candidate. Moreover, there is less uncertainty about an internal candidate's ability than about an external candidate's (τ I > τ E ). These differences result, therefore, in different levels of monitoring and, thus, different probabilities of dismissal. Result (i) of Proposition 3 follows immediately from Proposition 1 because the prior estimate of an external candidate's ability is both lower and estimated with less precision than is the estimate of an internal candidate's ability. The fact that the signal is less decisive vis-à-vis dismissal both when the prior estimate is high or the precision of that estimate is high means that the board is less responsive to a low value of the signal for an internal candidate than for an external candidate, which explains result (ii) of Proposition 3. If the board is both more likely to monitor a ceo hired externally and more likely to respond to the signal gained from that monitoring by firing him, then his expected tenure must be less than a ceo hired from the inside; that is, result (iii) of Proposition 3 follows immediately from results (i) and (ii).
Because Proposition 3 involves a counter-factual comparison -what would have been the treatment of the not-hired internal candidate -it is not readily tested empirically. It can, however, be turned into a more testable hypothesis if one is willing to make assumptions about the underlying distributions of the estimated abilities of the two types of candidates (i.e., the underlying distributions of µ I and µ E ). If the two distributions are similar to each other, then internal candidates who become ceo will tend to have higher estimated abilities than external candidates who become ceo ceteris paribus. The three results in Proposition 3 clearly hold whenever comparing candidates for whom µ I ≥ µ E . Consequently, a potential prediction of this analysis is that, controlling for board µ µ independence, ceos who were hired from the outside will tend to have shorter tenures than ceos who are hired from the inside.
It is important to recognize that this prediction relies on the underlying properties of the distributions of the estimated abilities. If the distributions are sufficiently dissimilar in specific ways, then this prediction will not be borne out in the data. For instance, suppose that the distribution of µ E were such that the vast majority of realized µ E s were generally much less than the majority of realized µ I s, so that the internal candidate is highly likely to win. However, assume further that there is a small mass of exceedingly talented external candidates for whom µ E µ I relative to the bulk of the internal candidates. Then, comparing the distributions of the µs for winning candidates, µ E will tend to be much larger than µ I , perhaps to the extent that winning external candidates receive less scrutiny than winning internal candidates (i.e., the "ability" result, part (i) of Proposition 1, outweighs the "uncertainty" result, part (ii) of Proposition 1). If one imagined that there was an essentially common market for external candidates, then the variation in the estimated abilities of external candidates across firms would be relatively small (indeed, there would be no variation if all firms faced the same external pool). Hence, one could, as an approximation, take µ E to be a constant for the economy. All the variation would, then, be in the quality of the internal candidates. In such a world, one would, then, get the following testable corollary to Proposition 3: Corollary 2 Assume that µ E is fixed across firms, but there is variation in µ I among firms selecting a new ceo. Then, controlling for board independence, δ, ceos hired from the outside will have shorter tenures on average than ceos hired from the inside.
It is important to remember that the conclusion of Corollary 2 (or any statement similar to it) is dependent on assumptions concerning the underlying distributions of talent in the internal and external candidate pools (recall the discussion surrounding Figure 1 ). There are two other, empirical, reasons that the prediction of Corollary 2 may be difficult to find in the data:
15 First, firms often hire heir-apparents from the outside a few years in advance of making them ceo, 16 which muddies the distinction between internal and external candidates, creating data-definition problems for the econometrician. A second difficulty is that firms sometimes employ interim ceos, particularly following unexpected ceo departures, who are almost invariably insiders, but, by definition, will have short tenures;
17 which also raises data-construction issues. The discussion of potentially different tenures for external ceo hires and internal ceo hires has so far controlled for the level of board independence (measured, possibly, by proportion of outside directors). If one "drops" that control, then Proposition 2, which predicts that more independent boards will be more inclined to hire external ceo candidates, and result (iii) of Proposition 1, which predicts that such boards will monitor more, offer an additional factor -beyond the one identified in Corollary 2 and connected discussion -for why external hires could be expected to have shorter tenures than internal hires; namely external hires are more likely to have been hired by boards more inclined to monitor and, thus, more inclined to dismiss a ceo early (i.e., before stage 4). Again, however, the underlying-distributions and data-definition issues raised above could create problems for verifying this prediction in the data.
Trends
Trends Due to More Independent Boards
As the analysis of the previous section makes clear, changes in the parameter δ will have clear effects on the selection, monitoring, and replacement of ceos. Huson et al. (2001) note a number of trends that could correspond to an upward trend in δ (i.e., toward a greater willingness of boards to monitor):
1. The proportion of outside directors on boards has steadily increased in the us and in other countries. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988, p. 593) report an increase in the average percentage of outside directors on boards from 37.6% to 53.9% over the period 1971 to 1983 for a sample of 142 nysetraded companies. Borokhovich et al. (1996, from 20% of outstanding equity held by us investors in 1971 to nearly 45% by 1994 (Figure 1 of Huson et al.) . As Huson et al. discuss, institutional owners tend to be more active in governance matters, and hence they tend to encourage governance practices consistent with higher δs. Gillan and Starks (2000) , for instance, find evidence that, in the early 1990s, institutional investors put pressure on firms to increase board independence through the stockholder proxy proposal process. Hence, the overall trend toward greater institutional investment could lead to a trend toward higher δs.
If, as hypothesized, these trends correspond to the parameter δ increasing over time, then the analysis of the previous section leads to the following predictions: Result (ii) of Proposition 4 follows from result (iii) of Proposition 1: An increase in δ leads to more monitoring of the ceo, regardless of whether he was an internal or external candidate. Moreover, an increase in δ leads to marginally more external candidates being hired (Proposition 2) and because these marginal candidates are beating out internal candidates who would otherwise have become ceos, they are more heavily monitored (Proposition 3), which further contributes to shorter ceo tenures. Huson et al. find evidence consistent with result (ii) of Proposition 4: Firings, as a percentage of all ceo successions, has been trending upward over the period 1971 to 1994 (see Table  II of Huson et al.) .
Changes in Governance in Response to Flatter
Hierarchies 20
In the previous subsection, the causality went from trends in board composition to consequences for ceo selection and tenure. While there do, in fact, seem to have been exogenous factors that could have led to the observed trends in board composition (e.g., governmental pressure and increased institutional stock ownership), appeal to such exogenous factors is not necessarily satisfactory. Take, for instance, the Cadbury report in the uk: While it appears to have led to more outside directors being appointed to boards (Dahya and McConnell, 2001) , one can't necessarily conclude that it led to more independent directors being appointed. As footnote 18 discussed, there is a distinction between directors who can be classified as outsiders and those who can actually be considered independent (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 , especially page 15, for further discussion of this distinction). Hence, observed changes in board composition could be cosmetic, intended to appease regulators and governments by adhering to the letter, but not the spirit, of externally imposed reforms. On the other hand, institutional investors have likely been more successful in imposing real reforms. Nevertheless, there is still something to be said for looking for a more organic source for changes in governance.
One such possible source lies in the change in corporate hierarchies. Rajan and Wulf (2003) offer evidence that us firms have been flattening their hierarchies. In particular, the middle layer between the ceo and division heads appears to be shrinking. For instance Rajan and Hence, the flattening phenomenon will be taken as given, here, and what will be traced out is its potential effect on governance structures.
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A consequence of a flattened hierarchy is that the number of potential internal candidates to become ceo is reduced. If the internal candidate present in Sections 2 & 3 is the "winner" of a "preliminary round of competition" among fellow insiders, then the expected estimated ability of the internal candidate (i.e., µ I ) will be greater the more competitors there are in this preliminary round because the best candidate is, then, being chosen from a larger pool. Formally, suppose there are N insiders indexed by n. Assume the preliminary round has the following steps:
1. There are N insiders, each with some unknown ability α n . There is a common, identical, and independent prior for each insider such that each α n is drawn from a normal distribution with mean M and precision γ.
21 Among them are increased competitive pressures, for instance from greater international trade and shorter product life-cycles, which can cause firms both to shed "fat" and to push autonomy down the hierarchy because of the increased need for quick responses. Changes in technology, particularly information technology, can also reduce the need for middle layers in a hierarchy. See Section 3 of Rajan and Wulf for a discussion of possible reasons.
22 Of course, as Rajan and Wulf, among others, have noted, changes in governance could also lead to a flattening of firms' hierarchies: If a tall hierarchy is evidence of "empire building" or other agency behavior, then improved governance -due, for instance, to increased institutional investing -could reduce such agency problems, leading to flatter organizations. Rajan and Wulf find, at best, mixed support for this direction of causality.
23 Ideally, one would want to model the motives to flatten the organization taking as one of the factors in such decisions the consequence for governance. Such an extension is left for future work.
2. A signal, q n , is observed for each insider (e.g., his performance as an executive below the ceo level). Assume the q n are independently distributed across the n according to a normal distribution with mean α n and precision r. Hence, the posterior estimate of insider n's ability is
which is held with precision t n ≡ γ + r (see, e.g., DeGroot, 1970, p. 167) . Note t n is the same for all n.
3. Because candidates vary only in terms of m n , the winner of this preliminary round is the one with the highest m n . He becomes the internal candidate (observe µ I = max n m n and τ I = γ + r).
Each m n is distributed normally with mean M and precision γ(r + γ)/r. 24 If Ψ(·) denotes this normal distribution (cumulative distribution function), then the distribution of µ I given N insiders is
The following lemma proves useful.
Lemma 1 The distribution F N first-order stochastically dominates F
N −1 (i.e., F N ≥ FSD F N −1 ) for all N ≥ 2.
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Consequences of this lemma are:
Proposition 5 Fix the diligence of the board, δ. If a flatter hierarchy reduces the number of insider candidates for ceo, then, relative to the pre-flattened state, (i) the proportion of ceo successions in which an external candidate is appointed is greater; (ii) the expected level of board monitoring (i.e., p) is greater; and (iii) the expected tenure of ceos is shorter.
24 E{qn} = E{αn} = M . The variance of qn|M is the sum of the variance of qn − αn and the variance of αn − M , which is
Result (i) follows immediately from Lemma 1: The probability that µ I will be below the cutoff at which an external candidate is hired increases as the number of insiders decreases. Because (a) winning internal candidates will, on average, have lower estimated abilities in the new regime and (b) the marginal external candidate is now more likely to win, it follows, from Proposition 1, that monitoring will increase in equilibrium. Result (iii) follows because the estimated abilities of winning candidates will tend to be lower than in the old regime, which means they tend to be monitored more and are more vulnerable to the information gleaned from such monitoring.
While it is true that a consequence of flatter hierarchies is more monitoring, this does not necessarily translate into a demand for tougher monitors (i.e., greater δ). Regardless of δ, all boards monitor more in response to a flatter hierarchy. Shareholders will only demand tougher monitors if the consequence of a flatter hierarchy is to increase the marginal benefit of tougher monitors. How a flatter hierarchy affects this marginal benefit is potentially indeterminant. To see this, suppose that shareholders' preferences are captured by
where λ ∈ (0, 1] is the portion of expected firm value captured by the shareholders and K(·) is the cost of imposing and maintaining a board whose diligence level is δ. 26 The marginal benefit to increased diligence is, thus,
If (9) is decreasing in µ, then a consequence of flatter hierarchies will be to raise the demand for greater board diligence. 27 Differentiating (9) with respect to µ yields:
hence, a sufficient condition for (9) to be decreasing in µ is that
which holds, for example, if the directors' cost function, c(·), is p 2 /2, for then P * = δ(V − µ), the cross-partial derivative of which is Φ − 1 < 0. A more general condition for ensuring that (10) is negative is
Lemma 2 Let g(·) denote the inverse function of c (·).
28 Assume the condition g (z)z + 2g (z) > 0 holds for all z in the range of δ(V − µ). Then the marginal benefit of increased diligence falls if τ increases or if µ increases.
Because the condition in Lemma 2 ultimately depends on properties of the third derivative of c(·), it is difficult to provide economic reasons to expect it to hold (of course, there are no obvious economic reasons to expect it not to hold either).
If one is willing to accept that condition, then it follows that a consequence of a flatter hierarchy will be more diligent boards:
Proposition 6 If the marginal benefit to board diligence is decreasing in the estimated ability of the ceo and in the precision of that estimate (i.e., if the condition in Lemma 2 holds), then a flatter hierarchy will lead to a more diligent board (i.e., δ increases if N falls).
Corollary 3 If outside directors are more diligent monitors than inside directors, then, under the assumption of Proposition 6, a flatter hierarchy will result in a greater proportion of outside directors on the board.
A potential alternative link between a flatter hierarchy and a greater proportion of outsiders on the board is the following: Mace (1971) and Vancil (1987) argue that a primary reason to put insiders on the board is to groom them as potential ceos (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988 , find statistical evidence in support of that proposition). If the hierarchy flattens so that there are fewer insiders worthy of being in contention for ceo, then the Mace-Vancil observation suggests that fewer insiders will be appointed to the board. This might, therefore, be a direct link between a flatter hierarchy and more outsiders on the board. A problem, however, with this alternative explanation is that it doesn't account for why these fewer insiders are replaced with outsiders. Why couldn't the firm simply reduce the size of the board so as to preserve the balance between inside and outside directors? To be sure, corporate charters often stipulate the number of directors that can serve on the board, but, as Weisbach (1988, 2003) note, board size can and does fluctuate over time.
An Extension: CEO Effort
To this point, the ceo has been implicitly assumed to expend no effort. To consider the issue of effort, suppose that after he is hired in stage 1, but before the board observes the signal (if it does at stage 2), the ceo can expend effort e at cost k(e) to him. Assume that k (0) = 0, k (e) > 0 for e > 0, and that k(·) is strictly convex. Assume that the ceo's utility is b − k(e) if he survives to the end (i.e., stage 4), but −k(e) if he doesn't survive (i.e., is dismissed in stage 3). The parameter b > 0 is a measure of the benefit the ceo derives from retaining his office. Take it to be fixed exogenously. Assume the ceo's choice of e is his private information (i.e., it is a hidden action).
Assume that there are two consequences to the ceo's effort. First, it enhances the firm's value by β(e), where β(·) is an increasing function.
29 Second, it affects the signal observed by the board; specifically, instead of observing y, the board now observes y + e ≡ỹ. Assume that the enhancement to firm value is realized (or, at least, learned by the board) after it must make its decision to retain or fire the ceo (i.e., after stage 3). This last assumption precludes the board from using the enhancement in firm value to estimate e.
Because the board wishes to base its firing decision on y, it would subtract e fromỹ if it knew e. It cannot, in fact, do this, because, by assumption, it does not know e. If, however, the ceo plays a pure-strategy in equilibrium, then it can, nonetheless, infer what e should be in equilibrium. Letê denote this inferred or estimated level of e under the presumption that the ceo plays a pure strategy. The board will then base its firing decision onỹ −ê = y + e −ê. The same replacement rule as before -expression (3) -applies, so the ceo loses his job if and only ifỹ
Note that the Y in (11) is the same as in (3). This cutoff rule can be reexpressed as the ceo loses his job if and only if
Therefore, using (4), the ceo's expected utility as a function of e is
The ceo chooses e to maximize (12) given the value ofê he anticipates the board has. The first-order condition is
In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the board must correctly anticipate the ceo's effort; that is,ê = e in equilibrium. The equilibrium value of effort, e * , is, therefore, the solution to
Because k (·) is strictly monotonic, with a range of [0, ∞), a unique e * exists that solves (14). In other words, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, then it is unique and, in it, the ceo supplies effort e * . The only step thus remaining is to establish that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which entails verifying that e * is a best response for the ceo when the board believes he will supply effort e * . Unfortunately, without imposing further structure on the model, there is no guarantee that a pure-strategy equilibrium e e and does exist (Panel B). In both panels
* is the first term in (14)). In Panel A, there are two local maxima, one at e 0 and one at e * . The one at e 0 is, however, the global maximum (best response) because, were the CEO to switch to e * , he would lose the area labeled I, which is larger than the area he would gain, labeled II. In contrast, in Panel B, it is e * that is the global maximum. Panel B also shows an alternative marginal cost (the dashed grey curve) in which e * is the sole (and, thus, global) maximizer.
exists: While it can be shown that e = e * achieves a local maximum of the ceo's expected utility whenê = e * , 30 it is not possible to show that is a global maximum. Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates what can "go wrong": In addition to the local maximum at e = e * , there is also a local maximum at e = e 0 , with the latter representing the global maximum. On the other hand, a pure-strategy equilibrium can exist -such an equilibrium is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2 .
An analysis of this game when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists is quite involved and would take us too far afield. Hence, attention will be limited to situations in which the pure-strategy equilibrium does exist.
30 The ceo's marginal benefit of effort can be shown to be
Because µ > 0 the expression in square brackets is in the right tail of the normal density for e ∈ (e * − ε, ∞), where ε > 0 is not to large. Because the normal density is shrinking as one moves further out the right tail, it follows that this marginal benefit is downward sloping in e in the neighborhood of e * . Marginal cost, k (e), is upward sloping. Hence, at e = e * marginal benefit intersects marginal cost from above; that is, e = e * is a local maximum.
Proposition 7 Assume for the relevant parameter values that the game with
ceo effort has a pure-strategy equilibrium. Then the following comparative statics hold:
(i) the lower the ceo's estimated ability, the more effort he expends in equilibrium; and
(ii) the more diligent is the board (i.e., the greater is δ), the more effort the ceo expends in equilibrium.
Result (i) -the "Avis result" 31 -predicts that ceos with lower estimated abilities will work harder than ceos with higher estimated abilities ceteris paribus. Intuitively, the marginal benefit of trying to boost the signal the board receives if it monitors is greater both the more likely it is that the board monitors (i.e., the greater is P * ) and the more likely it is that the board responds to a low value of the signal by dismissing the ceo (i.e., the lower is Φ). Because the board is both more likely to monitor and more likely to respond to the signal by dismissing the ceo, the lower is his estimated ability, the result follows.
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Result (ii) predicts that the more diligent a monitor the board is, the harder the ceo works. At first glance, this may seem such an "obvious" result that it hardly warrants attention. Yet, the mechanism behind this result is not necessarily obvious. Remember the board is not monitoring the ceo's effort; indeed, it cannot observe that effort within the time period in which it must make a decision about retaining him or letting him go. Rather the impact monitoring has on effort is indirect: Because the board seeks evidence about the ceo's ability -not how hard he has worked -the ceo has an incentive to try to influence that signal by working harder. The more likely the board is to seek this evidence (i.e., the greater is δ), the stronger this incentive is. In equilibrium, the board anticipates that the ceo will do this -and the more so the more diligent it is about monitoring -so it correspondingly discounts the signal it observes (subtracts e * from it). Even though no one is fooled in equilibrium, the ceo is compelled to supply e * in effort or otherwise risk increasing his odds of being fired.
Consequently, result (ii) can be seen as being in the spirit of Fama (1980) , which argues that a manager's concern for his reputation in the labor market will cause him to work hard. Here, it is not an external labor market that the ceo seeks to influence, but his own board of directors. It is also true, however, that while this concern with influencing the board can help to ameliorate the hiddenaction problem that exists, there is no reason to expect it to be a particularly 31 In the 1960s the Avis car rental company launched an ad campaign with the slogan "We're number two, we have to try harder." "We try harder" is still Avis's world-wide slogan.
32 A theoretical possibility in this model is that the Avis effect could outweigh the direct effect of a more able ceo such that the board prefers to hire ceos with lower estimated abilities versus ceos with higher estimated abilities. It seems unlikely that such a curious result would govern actual ceo-succession decisions.
effective solution insofar as the ceo's marginal-benefit schedule (the first term in expression (14)) does not match -except, possibly, by the most random of coincidences -the shareholders' marginal-benefit schedule, β (e) (Holmstrom makes a similar point about mis-matched incentives in his critique of Fama).
In equilibrium, the ceo's expected utility is
Differentiating (15) with respect to board diligence, δ, yields
which is negative because both partial derivatives are positive by Propositions 1 and 7, respectively, Φ < 1, and k > 0. Hence, the ceo's expected utility is falling as the board becomes more diligent. If, as seems reasonable, the ceo needs to be compensated for this loss in utility, then a consequence of a more diligent board is an increase in ceo compensation. Proposition 8 possibly offers some insight into the upward trend in executive compensation much decried in the popular press and among many in the public, and which has been widely documented in the economic literature (see, e.g., Hall and Liebman, 1998, Table IIa , which documents a 97.3% increase in average ceo salary & bonus from 1980 to 1994 and a 209% increase in average ceo total compensation over this same period; also see Hall, 2002, for additional evidence) . This period of increase corresponds with the period of increased vigilance in governance documented by Huson et al. (2001) , among others (recall the discussion in Section 4.1 above). A possible response from executives to more vigilant governance has been to demand and receive greater compensation; that is, to be compensated for the disutility they suffer as a consequence of this more vigilant governance.
As a final note on this extension, the discussion has been framed in terms of ceo effort. "Effort," however, can be understood to refer not only to positive actions (e.g., more time in the office, carrying out necessary, but unpleasant, tasks like firing subordinates, etc.) but also to refraining from pursuing actions that are beneficial to the ceo but harmful to the company (e.g., consumption of certain perquisites, empire building, etc.); that is, one can interpret e as negative perquisite taking.
An Extension: CEO Compensation
As Proposition 8 established, the model analyzed above can be extended to yield predictions about ceo compensation. In this section, I explore an alter-native extension that also potentially sheds some light on trends in executive compensation.
For convenience, I return to the version of the model without ceo effort. Assume, initially, that there are many ceo candidates and only a few firms, so that the firms have the bargaining power in negotiating employment contracts. In addition, assume initially that all candidates have the same estimated ability, µ, which is estimated with the same precision, τ .
Assume that a candidate for ceo will accept employment only if his expected utility exceeds some reservation level U . As in the previous section, assume that a ceo enjoys some benefit b > 0 if he survives to the last stage (stage 4). If he is dismissed prior to that stage, he receives no benefit. Let w be the wage he is paid. Then he accepts employment only if
Because the firms have all the bargaining power, (16) is binding; that is, a ceo's wage is given by
Differentiating that expression with respect to δ, the measure of the board's diligence, yields The cross-sectional prediction, result (i) of Proposition 9, might seem at odds with a sense, common in the popular press at least, that it is weak boards that overpay their ceos.
33 Such intuition is clearly mistaken when ceo talent is homogenous in the relevant market. Such intuition can, however, be redeemed -at least in part -if we depart from the assumption of homogeneity: Suppose, now, that there are a few "superstar" ceos in the market with estimated ability µ 1 . Let the rest of the market consist of "run-of-the-mill" ceos, with estimated ability µ 0 < µ 1 . Assume, however, that the estimated abilities of both sets of ceo candidates are estimated with the same precision (i.e., τ is common across all candidates). Beyond the differences in their estimated abilities, type-0 and type-1 ceo candidates differ in terms of their market power: The former have no market power and command a wage given by (17); while the latter have complete market power, which means they can capture all the surplus a board could gain by employing a type-1 ceo rather than a 0-type. Hence, the wage of a 1-type is determined by
where subscripts 0 and 1 denote whether the variable pertains to a 0-type or 1-type ceo candidate. Differentiating (19) with respect to δ, utilizing the envelope theorem, and using (19) to simplify yields
As (20) makes clear, the wage of a superstar ceo (i.e., type 1) varies in an indeterminant way with the diligence of the board. On the one hand, board diligence is a substitute for managerial ability (this is what, after substitution, the difference in the c(·)s represents in (20)). Hence, the marginal value of a superstar ceo over a run-of-the-mill ceo is less, the more vigilant the board is. On the other hand, a more diligent board is already a high-paying board, hence the incremental cost of a superstar is less than for a less diligent board (this is what the second term of (20) represents). Hence, the marginal cost of a superstar ceo over a run-of-the-mill ceo is less, the more diligent the board is. On net, there is no reason to expect one of the two marginal effects to be dominant and, in fact, one can find examples in which either one is dominant.
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In those cases in which (20) is negative, the following situation exists. Letw κ denote the wage of a type-κ ceo dealing with a more diligent board and let w κ denote the wage of a type-κ ceo dealing with a less diligent board (assume, for convenience, two levels of diligence). Then w 1 >w 1 >w 0 . That is, the highest wages in cross-section will be paid by the less diligent board. Depending on the relative frequency of the two kinds of boards relative to the two types of ceo candidates, it is also possible that the less diligent boards pay more on average than do the more diligent boards.
Indeed, the same conclusion about the cross-section can still be reached even ifw 1 > w 1 >w 0 : Because a firm with a more diligent board is a less attractive workplace for a ceo, it is possible that, even if the more diligent board is willing to pay more for a superstar ceo, the superstar's expected utility is higher at a firm with a less diligent board. So, again, the highest wages in cross-section are paid by the less diligent board. Hence, again, it is possible that average ceo compensation is higher at firms with less diligent boards.
While cross-sectionally, one can, thus, find an inverse relation between board diligence and ceo compensation, it is still likely that the time series effect of a secular trend toward greater board diligence is to lead to an increase in ceo compensation: As boards become more diligent, the compensation of the runof-the-mill (type-0) ceos increases because they require compensation for the greater disutility they suffer from working for more diligent boards. Because the run-of-the-mill ceos are the majority, the consequence for average ceo compensation across all firms is that it increases as board diligence increases on average across firms. To summarize this discussion: 
Final Thoughts
This paper has set forth a plausible model of board behavior -specifically that, to varying degrees, boards seek to determine whether they should keep the ceo they have or replace him, where replacement is a costly option -and shown how it can tie together a number of trends in corporate governance. In particular, if there is a secular trend toward more vigilant governance, then the model predicts the following trends should also be observed: (i) the frequency with which external candidates are the winning candidates to become ceo should increase; (ii) the average tenure of ceos should fall; (iii) ceo effort should increase; and (iv) average ceo compensation should increase. In addition, the model demonstrates that the trend toward flatter hierarchies (Rajan and Wulf, 2003) can be expected to lead to (v) an increase in the frequency with which external candidates are the winning candidates to become ceo; (vi) more monitoring of the ceo by the board; (vii) shorter average tenures for ceos; and (viii) more ceo effort. 35 Moreover, it is possible that (ix) a consequence of a trend toward flatter hierarchies is a trend toward more vigilant boards. The model also offers an insight into how board vigilance and ceo compensation can co-vary inversely in cross-sectional data, but co-vary positively in time-series data. Finally, if one is willing to assume the underlying distributions of estimated abilities for internal and external candidates are not too dissimilar or the distribution of the external candidates is degenerate, then the model predicts that (x) external candidates appointed ceo will have shorter tenures on average than internal candidates who are appointed ceo.
While the model is quite successful in tying together various trends in corporate governance, there is more work that can be done. Some of it is primarily technical, such as working out the mixed-strategy equilibrium that can exist in the effort model (Section 5). Other remaining work is more substantive. For instance, the ceo labor market has largely been ignored or, as in Section 6, modeled in a highly stylized manner. A richer model of this market should offer more definitive insights into patterns to be expected in the cross-sectional data.
A related issue is ceo compensation. Although the analysis presented here addresses issues connected with total compensation -particularly why its overall expected value should increase -the paper says little about the components of compensation. As boards become more diligent, should we expect the use of incentive pay to increase or decrease? Can the trend in greater board diligence be tied to the apparent trend towards greater use of stock options in executive compensation?
Another issue is to tie this model into the ceo-life-cycle model of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . In their model, over a ceo's tenure in office, more is learned about him. Because only able ceos are retained, this means that ceos with long tenures will generally have proved themselves to be considerably better than the expected value of replacements. This makes them "rare commodities," which in turn gives them bargaining power against the board. One objective they will bargain for is greater pay, but another is less scrutiny. Less scrutiny can be achieved only by getting a less diligent board. (Note this model, thus, offers another explanation for an inverse relation between ceo compensation and board diligence in cross-sectional data -high-paying firms are those with a proven ceo, who is thus able to bargain for high pay and a less diligent board.) The mechanics of the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model are such that there is a trend during a ceo's tenure toward less board diligence (a predictionif proportion of outsiders is a proxy for board diligence -borne out in the data, see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) . A question not fully addressed by either Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) or this paper is how an overall trend to increased board diligence can be reconciled with this tendency, within any given firm over the ceo life-cycle, towards less diligence? What are the mechanics by which boards become more diligent?
Despite these open issues, the analysis presented here demonstrates that starting from a simple model of board monitoring, one can tie together a number of trends in corporate governance. Moreover, this analysis provides a framework whereby one can consider the consequences of various reforms; for instance, that pressure to have boards that are tougher and more independent of management can have the, perhaps undesirable, feature of leading to greater executive compensation.
Next, differentiate W I (∆), recalling, from the proof of Proposition 1, that ∂V /∂Y = 0 (expression (21)) and ∂V /∂µ = Φ (expression (22)) and utilizing the envelope theorem:
If it can be shown both that W I (0) < W E and there is a ∆ such that W I (∆) > W E , then the existence of a ∆ m with the properties stated in the proposition follows from (24). To see that W I (0) < W E , observe that
= δP
where (25) follows from the envelope theorem. Hence,
because τ I > τ E . To show that there is a ∆ such that W I (∆) > W E , observe that
Hence, lim
This establishes the first part of the proposition. To show the "moreover" part, start from the identity:
Differentiate this with respect to δ, utilizing the envelope theorem:
where W I (∆ m ) comes from (24) and the third equality follows because (28) vs. external). If the change in δ does change the choice of candidate, then, from Proposition 2, an increase in δ causes a "switch" from the internal to the external candidate. By Corollary 1, if the internal candidate is hirable under any circumstances, µ I > µ E . Consequently, this external candidate would receive more scrutiny ceteris paribus than the internal candidate by results (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1. Because an increase in δ also increases the level of scrutiny (result (iii) of Proposition 1), the overall effect of an increase in the board's δ is to increase the probability that any ceo it employs gets fired. 
Proof of Lemma
Proof of Proposition 5:
Let Υ be the distribution of µ E in the relevant population and let M E be the support of that distribution. From Proposition 2, the internal candidate is hired if and only if µ I ≥ µ E + ∆ m . 36 Hence, the difference in the probabilities that the external candidate is hired when there are N − 1 insiders versus N insiders can be written: Observe that, for a given µ I , the cutoff value of µ E at which an external candidate will be hired is µ I − ∆ m . As µ I varies, both terms of this last expression also vary; however, d[µ I − ∆ m ]/dµ I > 0.
37 The expected probability of obtaining the signal (i.e., the expected level of monitoring) is
where υ is the density function corresponding to Υ and the subscripts on the P * s denote whether they are being evaluated at µ I or µ E (technically ζ in the latter case). If Z(·) can be shown to be a decreasing function, then reducing N where the subscripts on MB denote whether it is being evaluated for an internal or external candidate. If R(·) can be shown to be a decreasing function, then reducing N in (35) 
where (37) follows from (36) because (a) ∂M B I /∂µ I < 0 by Lemma 2; and (b) the fact that µ I − ∆ m < µ I and τ E < τ I mean that MB E > MB I by Lemma 2.
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Proof of Proposition 7: From (14), equilibrium effort is greater the greater is
Because µ > 0, a small decrease in µ pulls the argument of φ from the right tail of the normal distribution toward its mode, which, thus, means φ is increasing as µ decreases. From Proposition 1, P * also increases as µ falls. Hence (38) increases as µ falls, which establishes result (i).
The only term in (38) that depends on δ is P * , which is increasing in δ (recall Proposition 1). This establishes result (ii).
